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Abstract: 
This article is a review of the book Military Necessity: Civil-Military Relations in the 
Confederacy by Paul D. Escort. 
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Article: 
Military Necessity: Civil-Military Relations in the Confederacy. By Paul D. Escort. (Westport, 
Conn.; Praeger Security International, 2006. Series foreword, preface, illustrations, maps, 
notes, selected bibliography, index. Pp. xv, 215. $49.95.) 
This book is one of a larger series by Praeger Security International exploring how “changing 
threats that America has confronted throughout its history have tested its revered traditions of 
civil-military relations” (p. xii), particularly civilian control of the military. In Military Necessity, 
Paul D. Escott examines that American tradition in the Confederacy, providing a useful survey of 
current thinking on the Confederate high command. Readers familiar with Emory Thomas's The 
Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience, Thomas Connelly and Archer Jones's The Politics 
of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy, Stephen Woodworth's many studies 
of Confederate leadership, and Escott's own After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of 
Confederate Nationalism will recognize the general narrative direction. Escott argues that the 
Confederacy adopted a strong civilian authority based on Jefferson Davis's own experience as 
the U.S. secretary of war and because the new constitution vested a powerful executive. Davis 
fully dominated Confederate military policy, and the Confederate Congress either blandly 
supported his decisions, futilely opposed them, or failed to offer viable alternatives. 
 
The Confederacy faced urgent military problems, and the Federal government's advancing armed 
forces required the rapid militarization of Confederate society. Escott charts the progress of 
conscription, impressments, and the military boost to Southern industrialization and 
urbanization. He also smartly relies on Mark Neely's Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and 
the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism to demonstrate the surprising extent to which the 
Confederate government enacted or allowed extensive constitutional abuses. Politicians and 
other civilians who were once principled opponents of U.S. government encroachment proved 
adept at accepting these fundamental changes in the Confederacy. 
 
Officers in the Confederate army were occasionally eager to exert military control over 
threatened—or disloyal—municipalities, but they generally complied with civil authority. State 
authorities and judiciaries provided the only effective (if occasionally opportunistic) opposition 
to the increased militarization of Confederate society. Escott devotes one chapter to the unique 
case of the Trans-Mississippi Department—isolated from the Richmond government—and its 
commander. Gen. E. Kirby Smith, who became “an American proconsul on his own soil” (p. 
118). “Kirby Smithdom,” however, proved an exception. Ranking generals often had no scruples 
about forming alliances with politicians to advocate favored military policies such as the 
“western concentration bloc.” But even the most self-aggrandizing officers demonstrated 
admirable restraint when civilians frantically urged military control of the Confederate war effort 
in 1864 and 1865. 
 
Throughout the book, Escott focuses on how Confederates worked to forestall change. But he 
makes this particular reading current by examining how Southerners' core political and social 
values were tested by war and their disintegrating nation. “The Confederacy's politicians and 
editors revealed through their actions what their principles were made of, how they viewed  
themselves, and what they truly valued” (p. 161). Chandra Manning recently asked the same 
questions of common southerners in her work What This Cruel War Was Over. Here, Escott 
considers two of the Confederacy's major proposals to preserve its crumbling nation and stave 
off defeat. First, the government proposed a variety of schemes that would place Gen. Robert E. 
Lee in the role of military governor of the Confederacy, thoroughly smashing constitutional 
provisions. None of these plans was realistic, but politicians' willingness to consider them is 
revealing. (Neither Lee nor the Confederate army supported the idea.) Second, the executive 
department proposed a plan, reluctantly supported by Lee, to enlist enslaved black men into the 
Confederate army. Escott probably overestimates the support for the idea by common soldiers, 
but he is correct to note that politicians and other civilians vehemently opposed this disruption of 
the social order. That Southerners would consider a political revolution when events soured but 
would not countenance a social revolution is a conundrum that reveals the fundamental nature of 
the Confederacy. 
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